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GREENHOUSE: Let me start out by quoting you, Justice Stevens. You've said
many times that "learning on the job" was an important part of your long
tenure. You were already an experienced federal judge by the time you got
to the Court at the age of fifty-five, but things looked different by the end of
your tenure than they had seemed at the beginning, so I wanted to give you
a chance to reflect on some of what that learning consisted of.
STEVENS: Well, the answer to that question would be rather long. But it's true:
Every judge learns on the job. Every good judge learns on the job, that is.
Your comment makes me think a little bit about the confirmation process,
and when I went through the process, Ed Levi, who was the Attorney Gen-
eral, didn't give me any advice on how to answer questions, and neither did
anyone else in the White House.
GREENHOUSE: It was a simpler age.
STEVENS: And I remember talking to him about it some years later, when we
were talking about the apparently detailed preparation that nominees for
some offices, such as the Attorney General or members of the Court were
getting. I mentioned to him, "Well, you didn't give me any help-what's
different?" He said that he thought that a person who was nominated for
the job ought to be able to answer the questions that are raised. It occurred
to me then-and it has occurred to me many times since-that, really, the
* Associate Justice (Retired), Supreme Court of the United States. Justice
Stevens served in the U.S. Navy from 1942 to 1945 and was a law clerk to Justice
Wiley Rutledge of the Supreme Court during the 1947 Term. From 1970 to 1975, he
served as a judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. President
Ford nominated him as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, and he took
his seat December 19, 1975. Justice Stevens retired from the Supreme Court on
June 29, 2010. This transcript is adapted from a dialogue hosted by the Yale Law &
Policy Review between Justice Stevens and Linda Greenhouse at Yale Law School
on April 24, 2012.
t Senior Research Scholar in Law, Knight Distinguished Journalist-in-Residence,
and Joseph Goldstein Lecturer in Law, Yale Law School. Ms. Greenhouse covered
the Supreme Court for the New York Times between 1978 and 2008.
303
YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW
nominee should not be prepared to answer all the questions that are asked.
The right answer is, "I'd rather wait to read the briefs and think about the
issues before I tell you what my answer would be." The notion that you
should, in advance, understand how a nominee is going to vote on and de-
cide cases really produces exactly the opposite of what you want in a nomi-
nee. You want a nominee who will not come in with a predetermined
agenda, but rather will try to decide cases as they arise. As Byron White said
many, many times, "You learn about the case and then decide what to do."
You don't have all the answers beforehand.
GREENHOUSE: You made a comment in your very interesting memoir, Five
Chiefs, which I'm sure everybody here has read, talking about the Harmelin
case in 1991.' That was a case in which a life sentence was meted out to a
first-time offender for a rather minor drug offense. The Court, by a vote of
five to four, upheld the life sentence against an Eighth Amendment chal-
lenge. And what you wrote in the book, and what you had said earlier in a
speech, was that the three Justices who made up the core of the five who
voted to uphold the sentence were rather new on the Court-
STEVENS: Yes, they were.
GREENHOUSE: -and that the Justices that they replaced-Justice Powell, Justice
Stewart, and Justice Brennan-certainly would have voted the other way. I
want to quote the way you put this, because it's a rather provocative way to
put it. You said, "[J]ust as the meaning of the Eighth Amendment itself re-
sponds to evolving standards of decency in a maturing society, so also may
the views of individual justices become more civilized after twenty years of
service on the Court."' I want to give you a chance to expand on that a lit-
tle. I should mention that the three Justices about whom you made this re-
mark were Justice Kennedy, Justice O'Connor, and Justice Souter, and they
all underwent some change on the bench in twenty years.
STEVENS: It's interesting that you mention that case, because I think about it a
lot. There were two issues in the case. One was the basic question of wheth-
er proportionality is a part of the cruel-and-unusual-punishments analysis,
and I just think that the evidence is overwhelmingly in favor of Justice
Kennedy's conclusion that it was, even though his reasoning didn't go
much beyond stare decisis-saying we've done it in the past. But Justice
White wrote on both issues: whether proportionality is part of the analysis,
and then on the question of whether the particular sentence was cruel and
unusual. And I didn't say as much about that, although I have thought
about it since then, and I just think it's abundantly clear that, under today's
standards, the sentence would be held to be impermissible. I would think
that all three of the Justices probably would come to a different conclusion
today. I feel quite sure that Justice Kennedy would, and also that Justice
1. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991).
2. JoHN PAUL STEVENS, FIVE CHIEFS: A SUPREME COURT MEMOIR 226 (2011).
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Souter would. But it's out there, the precedent is still there, and it's really a
very unfortunate case.
GREENHOUSE: Well, speaking of the Eighth Amendment, you came on the
Court in January of 1975 in the shadow of Furman' but with the
post-Furman cases about the new death penalty statutes looming. In the
book you expressed some regret over your vote to uphold the Texas stat-
ute.4
STEVENS: That's correct. I think the vote in the other cases in which we upheld
the statute at issue was correct. But the Texas statute was particularly unfor-
tunate because it imposed a mandatory death penalty upon a finding of fu-
ture dangerousness. I can still remember discussing the issue with my law
clerk, George Rutherglen, who now teaches at the University of Virginia
Law School, and he felt strongly that I should have voted the other way. I've
often thought about that because he was dead right. As I reflect on it, I was
definitely wrong on that one.
GREENHOUSE: I guess there was a promise implicit in Gregg,' in the
post-Furman death penalty cases.
STEVENS: Well, there was sort of an understanding among those of us who vot-
ed that way in the case that, in actual operation, Texas had given indication
that they would construe the statute more narrowly than the text really
opened the door for.
GREENHOUSE: And of course, toward the very end of your career, in the Baze
case,6 you basically walked away from the death penalty, although not from
the stare decisis aspect of upholding the Court's precedents. That was the
end of a long journey of thought about this for you.
STEVENS: It was. Actually, I still remember reading Chief Justice Roberts's first
draft in the Baze case-and it sort of sunk in on me how, when you go to
such lengths to be sure that the death penalty is administered in a painless
fashion and not with undue suffering, you are really eliminating what many
people think is the proper justification for the penalty in the first place,
which is retribution: Do to the defendant the same kind of harm that he did
to his victims. If you are protecting the defendant from that kind of harm,
you're not inflicting the kind of punishment that the people who are
strongly in favor of the death penalty think is the real reason to justify it. So
it did hit me when that case was decided that the penalty really doesn't
make much sense.
3. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
4. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
5. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
6. Baze v. Reese, 553 U.S. 35, 71 (20o8) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
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GREENHOUSE: And I remember that one case that you cited in your separate
opinion in Baze was the recent habeas case from which you had vigorously
dissented: the Uttecht case7 on jury qualification and the ability of federal
courts to look into the behavior of the state trial judge in death-qualifying
the jury. That seemed to have been almost a turning point in your own
thinking about the intersection between habeas and capital punishment.
STEVENS: Well, there had been a number of jury cases, because things kind of
moved in that direction. The whole process of death-qualifying the jurors
really accomplishes the prosecutor's objective of tending to get a jury that's
more prone to convict than to acquit, and I think it does load the dice
against the defendants in a way that is peculiar to capital cases and really
quite unfair. It seemed to be quite inconsistent with the cross-section idea
that the jury should represent a cross-section of the community, and, if
there happen to be people out there who are opposed to the death penalty,
they are still part of the cross-section.
GREENHOUSE: So, in your consideration of the death penalty over thirty-plus
years, did you wrestle with the issue consciously or was it something that
just kind of grew on you as you saw the way the Court was handling some
of these cases?
STEVENS: Well, you're always troubled in every case-every case is troublesome
for all sorts of different reasons. But I wouldn't say it was a continuing
struggle or anything like that. You have to take the cases as they arise and
do the best you can with each one.
GREENHOUSE: Before we get into some of the other areas of the Court's juris-
prudence, I just want to make sure people realize how busy you have been
since you retired. I read somewhere that you still read every opinion of the
Court that comes down.
STEVENS: Yes, I do, and with interest. It's funny because when I finished my
year as a law clerk, I remember thinking, "Well, I know a little bit about the
Court now; I'm going to read every case as it comes down." And that lasted
for about three months. But since then, in my present position, I do have
time to read the opinions, and I do read all of them and have reactions to
them.
GREENHOUSE: And you have some public reactions to them. I remember you
said that you would have voted with Justice Alito's solitary dissent in the
Westboro Baptist Church case, the First Amendment case.'
STEVENS: Yes, I really thought he got it right. In the slander area, the rules un-
der the First Amendment are that if the person is a public figure, you can be
more robust and not as thorough and careful in criticizing him because a
public figure can pretty well defend himself. It contributes to wide-open
7. Uttecht v. Brown, 551 U.S. 1, 35 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
8. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1222 (2011) (Alito, J., dissenting).
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debate to have that kind of rule there. But you treat private figures differ-
ently. It didn't seem to me to make sense to treat this particular family as
though they were public figures. They were the victims of some very scur-
rilous attacks-according to the jury, it was deliberate infliction of emo-
tional harm-and it doesn't seem to me that there should be a First
Amendment right to engage in that kind of attack on private members of
the community. I thought it was very much like the defamation cases. And
I thought that Justice Alito was dead right in his appraisal of the case, and I
guess I was willing to say so.
GREENHOUSE: You've also spoken publicly about your views of the Affordable
Care Act case 9 -the health care case-as the author of the Raich opinion,o
which a lot of people cite as the Commerce Clause foundation for uphold-
ing the statute.
STEVENS: Well, on the Commerce Clause issue, Wickard against Filburn" and
the marijuana case seem to pretty well answer that, but there are other cases
that they'll have to grapple with. One of the cases that helped confine the
Commerce Clause, you might say, was the Violence Against Women Act
case." Bill Rehnquist wrote on that, and it is an issue that's coming back.
GREENHOUSE: On a finding that there was not enough of a commerce connec-
tion.
STEVENS: Yes.
GREENHOUSE: But on the pending health care case, do you have a view as to
how that ought to come out?
STEVENS: Well, I haven't read the briefs, and I really wouldn't want to express
an opinion on the bottom line of the case or the Anti-Injunction Act issue
or any of those issues unless I have a chance to read the briefs, but I will be
interested in seeing what they decide.
GREENHOUSE: You've written a couple of pieces for the New York Review of
Books, which is certainly an aspiration of many writers. You had one re-
cently, a review of the book about that interesting Delaware capital case.
STEVENS: Oh, The Rape Case by Irving Morris. Well, one reason I was interest-
ed in writing that review is that Irving is an old friend, and he had actually
(and I didn't get the message) asked me to write an introduction to the
book. The book review gave me a chance to talk about a case in which Ir-
ving represented me in a suit arising out of my service as a director of a
corporation that had nothing, no assets except a tax loss to sell. After we ar-
ranged to sell the corporation to a very profitable concern, they brought
9. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
10. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
11. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 11 (1942).
12. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
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suit to cancel the stock options that the directors had granted to them-
selves. They said that there was a breach of trust. I was one of those who
thought it was an appropriate method of compensation. They brought liti-
gation against us, and Irving Morris represented me in that case. So he was
my lawyer, and one of the reasons I had an interest in writing a review of
his book was an incident that happened during the trial of the case. I got a
chance to tell about it in the review: The lawyer for the other side repre-
sented to the judge that I had been untruthful in my testimony in the case.
And Irving said, "Well, you've got to put a witness on to say that." So they
called their witness to the stand. As he got on the stand, he was going to
contradict my testimony, and I was quite confident that my memory was
accurate. When he got on the stand to testify, he had a heart attack and died
in open court. That was a rather dramatic-
GREENHOUSE: Don't mess with John Stevens.
STEVENS: Yes. And so it gave me the chance to tell that story.
GREENHOUSE: That's a pretty good story. So, during the thirty years or so that
you and I were both in the same venue, we actually didn't talk very often at
all, but the few times we did, I always came away with some really interest-
ing little window into your thinking. I'll just recount one as a segue to an-
other subject. It was the case of Scott against Harris.'3 If you remember that
case, it was a due process case that had come up on summary judgment. It
involved a police chase in which the police forced a young driver off the
road on the grounds that he was driving so dangerously that the public was
endangered. The car went down an embankment, the driver was rendered a
quadriplegic, and the question was whether his due process rights were vio-
lated by unreasonable police behavior. The Court posted the video of the
chase on the website when the case came down, and, by a vote of eight to
one, the Court found that the chase was reasonable. And you were the one.
So I remember running into you at the Court, and I said, "You know, Jus-
tice Stevens, I think you were the only one who got it right in Scott against
Harris." And you said to me, "Well, I'm the only one who knows how to
drive."
STEVENS: I don't remember that, but I might well have said it. Because I
learned to drive when two-lane roads were common. You had to learn to
pass in fast traffic and so forth and so on. But one of the interesting features
of that case, Linda, was that when you look at the video-it was in the rec-
ord, so it was proper to look at it-but when you look at it by yourself in
your chambers, you don't get the help you would get from a lawyer if you
were in open court commenting on it or asking questions of witnesses
about what went on. The thing that struck me about the video was that it
shows these other cars after the police lights were already on. The video was
taken from the police car chasing the speeding motorist, and they had a
13. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007).
308
30 :303 2012
A CONVERSATION WITH JUSTICE STEVENS
camera in the police car and the camera shows other cars' lights zooming at
you-just, you know, very frightening. The other cars get off the road just
in time, and it looked like it really was a terribly dangerous thing. The only
thing that you didn't get if you just watched the video-unless you listen
very, very carefully-was that there were sirens on the police cars that were
chasing the suspect so that the motorists had notice in advance. It was like a
fire engine coming down the road, so they pulled off the road. Looking at it
in high speed, it looked terribly dangerous, but you get a very different im-
pression if you realize that, at the time, the other motorists had adequate
warning. Just like any other time when an ambulance or a fire truck is go-
ing with sirens, people get out of the way, and there's not that much risk.
And so the videos without the explanation of counsel or witnesses gave a
very misleading impression. And they were not shown in open court-we
were given copies to look at in chambers. It took me a while to figure out
what was going on with my law clerk, and I think that my colleagues came
to an inaccurate factual determination in a case in which appellate judges
should rely on trial judges and lower courts to sort out the facts. And in the
case, both the trial judge and the members of the court of appeals had held
that it was a jury question that should be resolved, and that no summary
judgment should be granted. I felt that it was an example of appellate judg-
es not really participating in the limited way that they should in the appel-
late court, and I was really-as you can tell-bothered by the result. I think
it was an incorrect decision, and when they show the video to the public as
they did, they still won't get the answer because it won't be entirely clear to
them. A piece of evidence should not be analyzed all by itself by judges
without the assistance of counsel and witnesses and the like. I just felt that
they did not discharge their duty properly, and they were more conserva-
tive drivers than I am and thought it was much more dangerous than I did,
and that showed up in the case.
GREENHOUSE: Yes, you flew your own plane until not too long ago, as I recall.
STEVENS: Yes, that's right. Well, it's been several years.
GREENHOUSE: But, I mean, obviously the case bothered you. What you just
said about it is so obviously reasonable, it's just kind of surprising that no-
body in the conference could be persuaded by the force of what you just
said here.
STEVENS: Well, if I were to tell you about all my failed efforts to persuade my
colleagues in conference, we'd be here a long time. [Laughter]
GREENHOUSE: Well, that's the subject I wanted to move to. So, you published
720 dissenting opinions during your tenure, which is the most of any Jus-
tice in history. Justice Douglas comes in second with 486, so you were way,
way ahead. These are not my counts, these are recently published articles.
STEVENS: That's a little embarrassing.
GREENHOUSE: Obviously, you're a believer in the utility of a dissenting opin-
ion, and a passage in your book that grabbed my attention was on the una-
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nimity in Brown against Board of Education.14 Everybody holds up that deci-
sion and says, "Look, how wonderful: Chief Justice Warren managed to ex-
tract a unanimous opinion in this landmark case." And what you say in the
book is that the unanimity in Brown came at a price, and the price was the
compromise of not dealing immediately with the remedial question and the
"all deliberate speed" language, which left everything just kind of out there,
happening slowly. So I want to give you a chance to talk about why a judge
publishes a dissent-why you published so many dissents.
STEVENS: Well, in that case, I think probably they all did end up persuaded that
it was the correct decision. But I don't think that the fact that it was unani-
mous was really all that important. And I do think that sending it back for
further consideration and so forth actually lent strength to the people who
did not want to comply. I was just expressing my opinion at the time I
wrote the book, but since then, I've read a biography of Judge Tuttle writ-
ten by one of his former law clerks who is a teacher at the University of
Georgia Law School," and I commend it to everybody in the room, to look
at what kind of a judge Elbert Tuttle was. He was really a surprisingly fine
judge. But one of the things that comes out in that book is that eight or
nine years after Brown was decided, the University of Mississippi, the Uni-
versity of Georgia, and the University of Alabama were still all-white
schools. And nine years went by. And I really think that, if the Court had
dealt with the decision ordering immediate relief in the particular cases be-
fore the Court, as had been done in the Delaware case," there would've
been a very different and much more prompt solution to that very difficult
period in our history.
GREENHOUSE: Even with a couple dissenting opinions?
STEVENS: Absolutely. The dissenting opinions would merely make it clear that
there were one or two Justices on the Court who agreed with the thinking
that was prevalent in a large part of the country. There were a lot of very,
very fine judges-now I don't think they were fine on this issue, but they
were respected judges-who took the dissenting position in resisting im-
plementation later on. And that comes out in some of the writing in the
book about Judge Tuttle. I don't think that Brown would have been
non-unanimous, but the fact that there might have been a dissent wouldn't
have been all that harmful.
GREENHOUSE: Of course, you're the author of some passionate dissenting
opinions of which you should be proud in Heller,7 Citizens United,'8 Bush
14. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
15. ANNE EMANUEL, ELBERT PARR TUTTLE: CHIEF JURIST OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS REV-
OLUTION (2011).
16. Gebhart v. Belton, 91 A.2d 137 (Del. 1952), aff'd, Brown, 347 U.S. 483.
17. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 636 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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against Gore,'9 and I'll mention Texas against Johnson,2 0 a dissenting opin-
ion that maybe not everybody expected-in the flag-burning case.
STEVENS: Right.
GREENHOUSE: There were two that you single out in the book that people
might not necessarily off the top of their heads think of when they think of
your jurisprudence. One was your separate opinion in Karcher against Dag-
gett," the redistricting case, in which you think the Court took a serious
wrong turn. Why don't I stop there and let you talk a little bit about where
the promise of Baker against Carr," in your view, got distorted.
STEVENS: It's interesting you mention Karcher against Daggett. For those who
are not familiar with the case, basically the Court held that the one-person,
one-vote requirement was very, very strict. Very, very minor deviations
were sufficient to violate the rule because the State of New Jersey had been
unable to justify them, and that was the holding in Justice Brennan's opin-
ion. And I wrote a separate opinion saying that I thought that the gerry-
mander violated the Equal Protection Clause, and we attached a map of dif-
ferent districts and showed how gross the gerrymandering was. Just within
the last two or three days, I was talking to Dina Mishra, my law clerk, and
we talked about that case. And I mentioned to her that I have thought
maybe I should've identified that as a case in which I did make a mistake.
And my mistake, I think, was in joining Brennan's opinion and not writing
merely my separate opinion, because then my separate opinion might have
been controlling because it was a five-to-four case. I went along with the
numerical decision, which I really didn't think was all that persuasive be-
cause, if you require such complete equality of numbers, the numbers of
people in the district will change between the time of the census and the
time of election anyway, so it's an impossible goal. And we were talking
about that case, which you bring up, and I was thinking, "Well, maybe that
was a mistake; I should not have joined the majority."
GREENHOUSE: The other dissenting opinion that certainly comes through in
the book that you felt very strongly about was Seminole Tribe."
STEVENS: Yes.
GREENHOUSE: You feel the Court made a drastic wrong turn.
18. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 929 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
19. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 123 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
20. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 436 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
21. Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 744 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring).
22. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
23. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 76 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
311
YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW
STEVENS: Yes. In a way, I've thought of the book as a petition for rehearing in
Seminole Tribe because I guess I did spend more time on that case than I
should. But I still find it mindboggling that, in the Chisholm case14 and the
Eleventh Amendment and so forth, the country in essence decided that the
common-law rule of sovereign immunity had not been repudiated by the
Constitution and had survived. The fact that it had not been made uncon-
stitutional doesn't seem to me to be the equivalent to saying it has been
permanently enshrined in the Constitution as part of the design of the re-
public or something like that. Accepting a common-law rule should not be
translated into the formation of a constitutional rule. I have tried to make
that point unsuccessfully over and over again.
GREENHOUSE: And you write that you think Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority
opinion in Seminole Tribe is going to go down as the most important opin-
ion with his name attached to it.
STEVENS: I think-well, perhaps that or the case reaffirming Miranda," up-
holding Miranda, is a very important opinion of his. But one of the opin-
ions in that sequence of state sovereign immunity cases invalidated a con-
gressional statute that made states subject to liability and patent
infringement suits, which is totally inconsistent with the notion of protect-
ing the dignity of the sovereign. As Judge Wood pointed out in a recent
opinion in the Seventh Circuit,26 the doctrine should not extend to the
commercial acts of sovereigns because that would not have been part of
sovereign immunity in the common law or the early days. To extend the
doctrine beyond its source is totally, totally unjustified.
GREENHOUSE: So, in writing about your years as the senior Associate Justice,
with the power to assign the majority opinion when you were in the ma-
jority and the Chief Justice was not, you mention your assignment to San-
dra O'Connor in the Grutter case,2 7 and you say that you are pleased with
the outcome and happy with Grutter, and that it will "pass the test of time
with flying colors."
STEVENS: Yes. Well, and people who heard the argument today [on Fisher v.
University of Texas at Austin" at Yale Law School's moot court] may not
agree, you know.
24. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (i Dall.) 419 (1793).
25. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000) (reaffirming Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1966)).
26. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Phoenix Int'l Software, Inc., 653 F.3d 448
(7th Cir. 2011).
27. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
28. 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 1536 (2012).
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GREENHOUSE: So, do you think Grutter passed the test of history with flying
colors?
STEVENS: Yes, I do. I think the decision was correct. And of course, the experi-
ence of the military was a very, very big part of that decision. So, yes, I think
it will pass the test of time.
GREENHOUSE: You tell the story of going to Carter Phillips after you left the
Court to ask him where the idea for that famous military brief came from,
and the answer, in case people don't know, was that it came from Gerald
Ford.
STEVENS: That's right.
GREENHOUSE: Is there any deus ex machina today that you think might save
Grutter from the current Court?
STEVENS: [Laughs] I don't know, I don't know.
GREENHOUSE: In your own encounter with affirmative action over your long
career on the Court-starting with Bakke, 9 through Fullilove,o and on to
Croson,3' Adarand,32 and the cases since then-it seems, at least from the
outside, that you came to see the issues in a different light over time.
STEVENS: You know, the case I think of as really most significant in my own
development and my own thinking on affirmative action was the Wygant
case.33 It was not a case involving a preference for students; the question in
the case was whether a contract that had been given to an African American
teacher to retain her services in the event of a cut-down in the size of the
faculty would be enforceable notwithstanding the fact that it only benefited
the teacher. I remember, when the case came up, that I thought that fact
was really significant because they were looking at the future benefit of hav-
ing an African American on the faculty and the educational benefits that
the students would derive from keeping that faculty member for the future.
Whereas, if they let her go, they would return to an all-white faculty, and it
seemed to me that the planning ahead, which protected her job, was think-
ing about the future educational benefits of that particular rule. And I re-
member, after reading the briefs in preparation for the case, I had a meeting
with Justice Powell in his chambers to talk about something else-I don't
remember exactly what it was, but I remember going down and talking to
him about something. And just as I was leaving, I remember saying to Lew-
is, "Well, we finally got an affirmative action case that's going to be easy. I
think it's a clear case." And he said, "You're absolutely right. It's great to get
29. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
30. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
31. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
32. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
33. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
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an easy case in affirmative action." And we left and that's the way it was.
Each of us thought it was easy for different reasons, as we found out after-
ward. But I thought that case was so significant because it focused on the
future of the program and its impact on people who would be affected ra-
ther than as a payment for justification of harms that have been done in the
past. And I think that makes a world of difference when you look at these
issues: If you look at it in a forward-looking capacity rather than a back-
ward capacity, you appraise it in a different way.
GREENHOUSE: So the benefit is not only to the individual involved, but to the
wider community.
STEVENS: Correct, correct. There was a public interest in having a faculty in the
high school in Jackson, Michigan, that was not an all-white faculty.
GREENHOUSE: Well, speaking of the moot court, you seem to still be really
bothered by Chief Justice Roberts's little saying about how to end discrimi-
nation14-that seems to still rankle.
STEVENS: Well, I think it's a very persuasive statement; I mean, a lot of people
are very much persuaded by it.
GREENHOUSE: So you had your own chance once at oral argument before the
Supreme Court.
STEVENS: Yes.
GREENHOUSE: Which, you write, you found a rather surprising experience
since, as a law clerk, you thought you knew the Court pretty well.
STEVENS: Well, the surprising thing, as you know from the book-and I veri-
fied this with John Roberts and with Ruth Ginsburg and others, too-is
that the first time you get up to address the Court, it really is a frightening
experience to have that sudden feeling of, "By golly, these guys are right
within arm's reach!" And I remember that very vividly.
GREENHOUSE: When you mentioned, just now, visiting Lewis Powell in his
chambers, am I right that one reason that that stands out in your mind,
aside from the fact that the Wygant case came up in conversation, is that
Justices don't tend to just kind of bop into one another's chambers?
STEVENS: That's true. Of course, I don't always know about my colleagues, but
I very rarely would visit in another Justice's chambers. They would very
rarely come to my chambers. But it happens. I'd been in Justice Brennan's
chambers to talk about cases, and others had come in to talk to me, but it
did not really happen very often. We did generally communicate in writing
with memos about cases, and then we'd also talk on the phone a good deal
about a particular case, but it's not something that's routine.
34. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007)
(Roberts, C.J.) (plurality opinion) ("The way to stop discrimination on the basis
of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.").
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GREENHOUSE: So it stands out in your memory as not an everyday thing.
STEVENS: That's right. Although, I must say that I did have conversations with
Justice Powell more than most members of the Court. He would stop in
and see me, and I would talk to him. We had certain common history that
gave us a common interest in a number of things.
GREENHOUSE: The history of actually having been practicing lawyers?
STEVENS: Well, both practicing lawyers and our military experience had a cer-
tain similarity to it. He was involved in communicating to the operating
forces the results of our intelligence obtained from decryption, and it was
very important not to let them know where that information came from,
because they might be captured.
GREENHOUSE: He was decorated for that, as I recall.
STEVENS: Yes, he was.
GREENHOUSE: There's just few more areas I want to talk about, and then we've
got some written questions from the audience. One is City of Boerne,15 the
Fourteenth Amendment, Section 5 case that overturned the Religious Free-
dom Restoration Act as applied to the states. You voted with the majority
in City of Boerne, and I just wondered whether, with the passage of time,
you had had occasion to wonder whether that case became what you
thought it was.
STEVENS: Well, it certainly became more than I realized at the time. But I still
think it was a correct decision. I think that Congress was trying to amend
the Constitution when they enacted that statute.
GREENHOUSE: Right, right. How about Chevron?6 Most cited case in history.
Did you think you were launching a revolution?
STEVENS: No. No, I really didn't, and I'm not an expert on everything that's
happened to Chevron since, but I thought it was really pretty well-settled
law that we should defer to the agency in a case like that. And, of course,
that was not unanimous. When it was discussed at conference, Warren
Burger passed, and Bill Brennan voted the other way, so Byron had to as-
sign the case, and he asked me if I'd be willing to take it on. I spent most of
my writing on the case in a very careful study of the facts and the history.
The part of the opinion that's most frequently quoted is only two or three
pages in the middle, and there are about thirty or forty pages before and af-
ter that I wrote out on a yellow pad.
GREENHOUSE: You quote, in the book, somebody who said that an author is
seldom the best judge of how readers will react to his work.
35. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
36. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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STEVENS: Right. I have quoted that. That's a quote from President Abraham
Lincoln. "The world will little note, nor long remember, what we say
here .... "
GREENHOUSE: So that would probably apply to Chevron-
STEVENS: Oh, I don't know. They're not in the same ball park.
GREENHOUSE: -it would maybe apply to your opinion in the Paula Jones
case,38 maybe apply to Kelo,39 the takings case, which you thought was quite
an ordinary application of takings law yet it launched a firestorm of contro-
versy.
STEVENS: That's probably the most unpopular opinion that anybody has writ-
ten during my term. But it was dead right. It was absolutely right. And it's
interesting, because it's criticized for not being faithful to the text of the
Constitution, whereas the text of the Constitution merely requires that
when there's a taking, the person whose property has been taken be com-
pensated. A literal reading of the text is merely a requirement that there be
compensation paid. It doesn't place any limit on the purpose for which a
taking can be made. And Dean Treanor has studied that at some length,
and that was the purpose. It was to prevent further uncompensated taking.
And of course, if you read the earlier cases, they go much, much farther in
their language than even Kelo did. But there were all sorts of reasons why
Kelo was unpopular. The project was not well thought out; the big drug
company abandoned the city after it started, so the thing was not a success.
And of course it was a private home and a very sympathetic person who
lost her property.
GREENHOUSE: Right, right. I'll ask you about one more topic, and then we'll
turn to a few questions from the audience. As you've written and as we
know, when you were nominated to the Court at the end of 1974 in the
shadow of Roe against Wade,40 you were the first person nominated to the
Court after the Court decided Roe. You didn't get a single question about
Roe in your confirmation hearing.
STEVENS: That's right.
GREENHOUSE: And I gather that you hadn't, yourself, had much occasion even
to think about the issue. So I just wanted to give you a chance to reflect on
that simple age when abortion was not a highly politicized topic.
STEVENS: Well, one of the things that reminded me of that situation was the
fact that, when Justice Thomas went through his confirmation hearings, he
was asked about it, and was asked about whether this was the subject of dis-
37. Abraham Lincoln, Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863).
38. Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997).
39. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
40. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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cussion here at Yale Law School when he was a student. And he said, "No, it
really wasn't." And people thought he was not being truthful in his testi-
mony. I felt that was terribly unfair to him because that was about the same
time that I went through the hearings, and I wasn't asked questions about it
in the context in which you would have expected a question if it was a
burning issue. And I just thought it was interesting that it later became-of
course, there was a lot of mail was sent to Harry [Blackmun], there's no
doubt about that-but as to whether it was a prevalent topic, I really don't
think it was at the time. At least that's my memory.
GREENHOUSE: And so how did it happen that, in your view, it became such a
prevalent topic?
STEVENS: Well, of course, for some of the same reasons that Kelo was so un-
popular. There are groups out there that don't like some of our decisions,
and they explain publicly what their views are and stir up positions that lat-
er have political significance.
GREENHOUSE: And when you came on the Court, you had no particular view
about Roe one way or the other.
STEVENS: No, I didn't.
GREENHOUSE: I gather you hadn't had much occasion to think about it. But by
the end of your tenure, you were one of the most stalwart, significant de-
fenders of Roe.
STEVENS: I think, well, I was one of them, yes.
GREENHOUSE: Right. I mean, did that reflect your stare decisis view?
STEVENS: Well, I think I make this point in the book. I never thought that the
right was best explained as a right of privacy following from Justice Doug-
las's opinion in Griswold.4' I thought that was not a very persuasive opin-
ion, talking about the numbers and all, and I still think that Potter Stewart
wrote a very succinct statement that this is a terribly important liberty in-
terest, and, if you focus on the liberty interest and the importance of the
decision to the person who has to make the decision, you get a better ap-
praisal of why it is of constitutional significance. And then we talk about it
as sort of a penumbra in privacy and all that.
GREENHOUSE: Yes. I guess people were busy running from Lochner" and run-
ning from substantive due process, which, in your view, would've been a
stronger basis.
STEVENS: That's right. Talking about substantive due process-the Kelo deci-
sion, you know, was a substantive due process decision. The old Chicago,
41. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
42. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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B., and Q case43 is cited-I made the mistake in a footnote in Kelo of citing
that as having incorporated the Fifth Amendment. But that case doesn't
even cite the Fifth Amendment. It's a case that held that the Fourteenth
Amendment has substantive as well as procedural significance and that, as
an old common-law rule, there must be compensation on a taking, and
that's what the case held. It was a substantive due process case.
GREENHOUSE: Well, maybe not the last one ever to come down, but people are
afraid of that kind of response. Okay, here's a question from the audience:
Since you left the Court, what decision has been the most disappointing
and, on the other hand, the most heartening?
STEVENS: Well, I really think the most disappointing case has been the case in
which the Louisiana prosecutor concealed evidence that resulted in a man
having to stand death-
GREENHOUSE: Right, the Connick case.44
STEVENS: I think that was a really bad case on two levels. One, I think it incor-
rectly concluded that there was no liability under existing law for failure to
train the members of the staff for the very flagrant violations of the duty to
disclose exculpatory evidence. But even beyond that, the case illustrates
how wrong the court was in Tuttle against Oklahoma Cit 5 in not applying
respondeat superior as a basis for liability against public officials. Because
Tuttle and the earlier case, Monell,4' relied on very incorrect analysis of leg-
islative history and reached a flagrantly improper result, and, if the court
and/or Congress simply applied the respondeat superior rule to the prose-
cutor's office, they wouldn't have to engage in lengthy trials about whether
training was adequate or all this sort of stuff. It would simply provide a rule
that would lead to careful attention to the constitutional requirements. So
that's one that has really bothered me.
GREENHOUSE: Right. Next question: Do you agree that the best way to end
discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of
race?
STEVENS: Well, there are two parts to the question. You have to ask, "What is
the discrimination on the basis oP" It's interesting-in the Fisher case,
they're talking about the injury to two white students who did not qualify
because the University of Texas at Austin has a larger pool of admissions
slots available for other purposes, one of which was affirmative action. But
if they had a larger pool available, say, for people who wanted to study ori-
ental art or something-if they reserved two hundred places in the class for
43. Chicago, B., & Q. R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
44. Connick v. Thompson, 131 U.S. 1350 (2011).
45. Tuttle v. Oklahoma City, 471 U.S. 808 (1985).
46. Monell v. City of N.Y. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
318
30:303 2012
A CONVERSATION WITH JUSTICE STEVENS
people who wanted to specialize-there would have been the same harm to
the plaintiffs as there was in Fisher. So they were not discriminated against
on account of their own race. Some other people were benefited-different
members of a different race-and the impact on the people who were hurt
is exactly the same as if the same number of spaces had been reserved for a
nonracial purpose. So was is it discrimination on the basis of race, or wasn't
it?
GREENHOUSE: Right. So that's the antecedent question that you have to answer
before you get into that little slogan, I guess. Do you still hold to your opin-
ion in Texas against Johnson, the flag-burning case?
STEVENS: Well, I think the case was incorrectly decided. I would not-
obviously, I wouldn't overrule it now. There are two or three interesting
things about that case. One is that nobody burns flags anymore, so it obvi-
ously isn't a vital method of expression. And the other thing that troubled
me about this case was that, if you read the opinion closely, the rationale
was viewpoint discrimination. It wasn't the fact that the people who were
demonstrating and were opposing the Reagan Administration's policies
didn't have an adequate opportunity to explain why Reagan was all wrong.
But the message that the flag burning carried, according to the majority,
was, "We don't like flags. We don't like statutes that prohibit flag burning."
It was a point of view about flag burning, and, if you follow that reasoning,
almost any kind of expressive conduct would be viewpoint related. For ex-
ample, nude dancing or parading in the nude is against the law. But under
the Court's rationale, it should be protected because you are expressing a
viewpoint that parading in the nude is OK. And so it's a very broad ra-
tionale that the Court used in the case, which I really don't think is correct.
So I remain persuaded that the case was incorrectly decided. Now, I think
you can make an excellent argument, and it may well be true, that there is
symbolic value in saying, "This is the kind of free country in which any citi-
zen who wants to burn the flag can do so to show how free we are." There's
great value in that, there's no doubt about that. But as for protecting an
important means of expression, the case is a zero because nobody ever
burns flags.
GREENHOUSE: Yes, once it became constitutional, it was no more fun.
STEVENS: That's right.
GREENHOUSE: You game for a couple more questions?
STEVENS: Sure.
GREENHOUSE: Okay. After the health care arguments, many Court-watchers
lamented the Court's tone, separate and distinct from the substance of the
arguments. How has the tone of the Court changed, and are you troubled
by it? Did you listen to the arguments? Or did you read the transcripts?
STEVENS: No, I haven't; I've read excerpts of it. Well, it's always been a prob-
lem. I mean, there are some arguments in which the tone is a little more
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adversarial than it might be in others. I really believe that the oral argument
process works well on the whole, and I would not want to criticize any
member of the Court for his participation in the dialogue. The dialogue is
very helpful to the decision that is ultimately made.
GREENHOUSE: How about criticizing anybody for not participating?
STEVENS: I would never criticize Clarence Thomas. He believes, and I think
correctly, that he wants to hear what other people have to say, and you may
not know this because he doesn't ask questions, but he is always thoroughly
prepared. Before argument, he knows everything in the briefs, he has
thought about it a lot. He wants to hear what's said. And he thinks he gets
more out of listening, and there's a lot to be said for his point of view.
GREENHOUSE: Do you believe the current rule of optional self-recusal should
be changed? There's all this debate now about ethics and what should be
binding on the Court.
STEVENS: No, no. And I also am very much opposed to the notion that Justices
should be compelled to explain why they recuse themselves. There was a
case that I recused myself from when I was a court of appeals judge in
which the reason for my recusal was that I had some adverse opinion about
one of the parties to the case, and I thought if I had been compelled to ex-
plain why I recused myself, it would have been very prejudicial to one of
the litigants. And I think there are cases in which a disclosure rule requiring
Justices to explain their reason for recusal would not be in the best interest
of the Court or of the litigants.
GREENHOUSE: OK, we'll make this the last question. Do you think the Court's
activity should be more transparent? Or, I guess to broaden that a little, do
you think there's a way in which the Court could change its behavior to
make the public at large have a deeper understanding of the Court and its
processes and what it does?
STEVENS: Well, of course, there are people who say the Court should do this or
that-for example, televising proceedings. But I would not do anything
that would impair the ability of the members of the Court to conduct their
oral arguments in the way they think is most effective. Televising would
benefit the Court and the public from learning how well-prepared the Jus-
tices are and how they do have intelligent questions to ask. And so that
would be a plus. But I think it is more important that the Court operate ef-
fectively. And I think that the oral argument on the whole is a constructive
part of the process.
GREENHOUSE: Well, I think with that, we've had a good chat, and I thank you.
STEVENS: Thank you, Linda.
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